Cultural and historical context, cited but not evidence. No figure in the tables above rests on
any of it.
During the powered descent of Apollo 11 the guidance computer interrupted the
crew five times with program alarms. The Apollo 11 Mission Report lists them in
its table of lunar descent event times: a 1202 at 102:38:22 and again at
102:39:02, then a 1201 at 102:42:18 and 1202s at 102:42:43 and 102:42:58. The
same table logs the landing at 102:45:40.
The report’s account of what the crew saw is that the first alarm came 5 minutes
16 seconds after ignition, that the alarms continued intermittently for more
than 4 minutes, and that monitoring of the computer information display was
occasionally precluded. It adds that continuation of the trajectory was
permissible throughout.
Section 16 explains what the numbers meant. The alarms were of the Executive
overflow type, which the report defines as the computer being unable to
accomplish all the data processing requested in one computation cycle. When the
Executive program is asked to schedule a job and every storage location is
already assigned, it displays a program alarm and starts a software restart.
Analyses and simulations traced the overload to counter interrupts arriving from
the rendezvous-radar coupling data units. The report adds that the computer
normally runs at about 90 percent of capacity during the peak of powered
descent.
The decision to keep going was not taken in the moment. The mission support
section records that it had been decided before flight that bailout-type alarms
such as these would not prevent continuation of the flight.